

Reviews

CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2007

What Room for Manoeuvre?

Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, editors

Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008. xvi, 328pp,
\$29.95 paper (ISBN 9780773533974)

Now in its 23rd year, the *Canada Among Nations* series has proven to be an indispensable source for any serious student of Canadian foreign policy. The latest volume, co-edited by Carleton University's Jean Daudelin and the Centre for International Governance Innovation's Daniel Schwanen, upholds the high standards of scholarship and practical utility that readers have come to expect from some of Canada's leading foreign policy analysts and practitioners.

The approach of this year's editors is ambitious. Thirteen separate chapters (and 17 different writers) have been commissioned around one very specific question: how much room does Canada have to manoeuvre in world politics? The editors also aim to prove that, contrary to the opinions of scholars who emphasize the constraints faced by national foreign policy practitioners, the phenomenon of globalization has in fact increased the opportunities for Canada to make its own way on the world stage. That they are not entirely successful in either case is neither surprising nor crucial to the overall utility of the volume: *What Room for Manoeuvre?* is valuable to

the scholarly and policy communities because of its breadth as well as the quality of some of the individual pieces.

The editors divide the book into four sections. Their provocative introduction is followed by six chapters that examine the opportunities and constraints faced by policy players in Ottawa, three that consider Canada's room for manoeuvre on the world stage, and then four that focus on North America. They contend that there are six elements that can affect a state's ability to effect change: the extent of its willingness to trade off the constraints of multilateral engagement for the opportunities created by membership in international organizations and institutions; the ability of its government to establish a truly national foreign policy; the impact of its global reputation; its international capacity, defined in terms of human, military, and political resources, and infrastructure; the global socioeconomic context; and, finally, less controllable factors such as geography.

In this context, argue the editors, so long as Canada acts rationally, improves its relationship with the United States, takes advantage of its membership in international organizations and institutions, invests in its foreign policymaking capacity, and accepts that any room for manoeuvre will necessarily be constrained by a changing external environment, Ottawa can indeed play a significant role in the world.

A number of the contributors agree. In examining Canadian international economic policy, Wendy Dobson of the University of Toronto argues, for example, that "we have lots of room for manoeuvre if we are focused and imaginative, anticipate change, and prepare to seek new sources of growth if old ones flag" (31). University of Ottawa professors Jeremy de Beer and Michael Geist argue that Canada can lead in the development of a global intellectual property regime. Historica Foundation president Colin Robertson writes that, with effort, Canada has significant room for manoeuvre in its relations with the United States. And Wilfrid Laurier's Debra VanNijatten laments Ottawa's failure to embrace its opportunities to direct North American environmental policy.

Others, like the University of Ottawa's Stephen Brown, are less certain that recent developments have made it easier for Canada to make a difference. In an engaging and thoughtful chapter on the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Brown argues that the government's increasing interest in development in Afghanistan has limited CIDA's flexibility. Trevor Finlay of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs emphasizes the impact of the United States on Canada's

ability to promote nuclear nonproliferation effectively. And the University of Toronto's Stephen Clarkson notes that Washington will continue to function as a significant constraint on independent Canadian foreign policy activities.

Other chapters are less focused on the editors' central theme. The best of them is by Dalhousie's Dan Middlemiss and Denis Stairs. They reject the argument that, during a period of significant reinvestment in the Canadian forces, the military has become any more able to set the national foreign policy agenda. "Duties and commanders advise," they note, "but cabinets and prime ministers decide" (85). Other essays that merit consideration in the classroom include Christopher Kukucha's and Tom Keating's thorough examination of Alberta's role in the national foreign policy process and Université Laval's Jean-Christophe Boucher and Université du Québec à Montréal's Stéphane Roussel's summary of their ongoing research into what they call the Québec pacifist myth. Both chapters provide succinct, detailed analyses of significant and relatively understudied themes in contemporary Canadian international relations.

In spite of the quality of the chapters, the editors' overall argument suffers from a lack of historical context. Back in 1942, the noted public servant Hume Wrong articulated what later became known as Canada's functional principle: Ottawa could make a difference in world affairs—and had a right to commensurate influence—when it had both the capacity and willingness to do so. Although Wrong's principle has received significant attention from historians and political scientists, the critical corollary, one that was practised more often than it was written down, merits greater consideration in the context of this volume: Canada, he suggested, had the greatest capacity for global influence when it focused on issues that the great powers did not consider priorities (in the 1940s, for example, this meant rewriting the aspects of the UN charter that dealt with the economic and social council). This basic argument largely stands the test of time and is more consistent with the general conclusions in this volume than is the editors' much more complicated thesis. With this in mind, it is regrettable that this still very good volume has no chapter on water, an issue that seems likely to be seen eventually as a failed opportunity for Canadian practitioners of international affairs, nor anything on pandemic diseases—another case in which the greatest powers have not yet recognized what is coming.

Adam Chapnick/Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College

AT THE SHARP END

Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916

Tim Cook

Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007. 600pp, \$40.00 cloth (ISBN 0-670-06734-2)

SHOCK TROOPS

Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918

Tim Cook

Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008. 728pp, \$40.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0-670-06735-0)

VIMY RIDGE

A Canadian Reassessment

Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and Mike Bechthold, editors

Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007. 368pp, \$38.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0-88920-508-6)

After two generations of peace, Canadians are rediscovering what it means to be a nation at war. More than 100 Canadian soldiers have passed into honoured memory while fighting in Kandahar's dusty deserts. Upon their arrival home, they are met by thousands of ordinary citizens and patriots, who line the windy overpasses of Ontario's Highway 401 to watch the repatriation convoys travel from the air base in Trenton to the coroner's office in Toronto. Whatever one's political beliefs or opinion on NATO's mission in Afghanistan, it is undeniable that the sacrifices made by Canadian forces personnel have reawakened a passion for the country's military heritage.

In light of this resurgence, it is no surprise that a new generation of Canadian historians are following in George Stanley's and Jack Granatstein's proud footsteps. The First World War, Canada's largest foray into international affairs, has come in for particular scrutiny, both for its military significance and for its enormous role in the ongoing search for a Canadian national character.

Tim Cook, a research professor at Carleton University and historian at the Canadian War Museum, recently published his massive two-volume study of the Canadian Corps in that conflict. The first volume, *At the Sharp End*, appeared in 2007, and the second volume, *Shock Troops*, the following year. Together they comprise an epic work of history, totalling over 1100 pages, and cover the entire war from the perspective of the individual

Canadian soldier. As Cook notes in his introduction to volume one, “The focus here is on the infantry at the sharp end: those who faced the enemy and bore the heaviest brunt of the fighting” (4). He spent almost a decade researching the history of every unit of the Canadian Corps, drawing on the collections of the National Archives and the Canadian War Museum, as well as numerous personal diaries, letters, and many other primary and secondary sources.

The depth of Cook’s research allows him to portray the fighting in the trenches as though he were a contemporary journalist embedded with a combat unit in Iraq or Afghanistan. “One by one, the French guns fell silent,” he writes in a passage detailing the Germans’ first use of gas against a sector held by French and Canadian troops. “As the enormous cloud enveloped and obscured position after position, insidiously seeping into the very crevices that sheltered soldiers from conventional fire, the French defenders were smothered.” The reader shares the troops’ terror as the gas enveloped their positions. “Colonel E.W.B. Morrison recounted seeing the red-panted Zouaves and French soldiers stumbling from the front, ‘faces flecked with blood and froth. Frequently these men would fall down under the feet of the mob, and roll about like mad dogs in their death agonies’” (vol. I, 116). In both volumes, passages such as these and detailed descriptions of hand-to-hand combat illustrate the ghastly realities of trench warfare.

While unprecedented in its level of detail, Cook’s work hews close to the traditional Canadian narrative of World War I. “The Great War was Canada’s war of independence,” he writes towards the end of the second volume (627). He portrays the war as an experience that unified a disparate group of colonials, overcoming fierce inter-unit rivalries and regional, linguistic, and religious differences. While Cook notes that Canada had already existed for 50 years by the time of the celebrated victory at Vimy Ridge, he argues that such successes provided tangible symbols of Canada’s importance on the world stage. Canada now had something to be proud of beyond its membership in the British empire. Cook concludes his work with a salute to the men he has devoted his life to studying: “it was these citizen soldiers—from across Canada—who were forged into the shock troops of the Western Front, where they fought, endured, and finally delivered victory in the Great War” (vol. II, 648).

Standing alongside this conservative—if convincing—portrayal of the First World War in Canadian history is *Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment*, edited by Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and Mike

Bechthold of Wilfrid Laurier University. This collection of essays by noted scholars tests long-held Canadian beliefs about the battle and its place in the nation's memory. The contributions are varied, covering such topics as the strategic background of preceding campaigns, the battle itself, and how the battle has been memorialized and studied over the intervening years.

The articles are of uniformly high quality in both writing and research. Although they cannot all claim to offer fresh reassessments, some are genuinely useful and original. British military historian Gary Sheffield, for example, considers Vimy's role in the United Kingdom's collective memory. Every year, numerous British school groups visit the Vimy Memorial, where Canadian guides give them educational tours. Sheffield does not aim to downplay Canada's role in the battle, but does make the fair point that it was only one part of a larger British operation.

Andrew Godefroy, a strategic analyst for the Canadian army, offers similar insight in his article on the German army. In particular, he discusses the lessons that German generals drew from their defeat, which was blamed almost entirely on the poor leadership of the army's commander, who failed to recognize the signs of a major attack in the run-up to the battle. Surprisingly, Godefroy discovers that the German army's official records do not describe Vimy as a defeat but rather as a minor tactical reverse. Given the British expeditionary force's inability to exploit the capture of the ridge and launch a full-scale breakthrough, it was hardly a meaningful defeat for the Germans. Indeed, according to the records of some German units, containing the Canadians and British around Vimy was itself a victory, since the Canadians suffered over 10,000 casualties for the sake of only a few square kilometres.

Unfamiliar perspectives such as these, plus the detailed articles on battlefield medics and the history of the Vimy Ridge memorial, ensure that this volume truly stands out. While not as ambitious as Cook's work, it nevertheless adds valuable information and offers a new perspective on one of Canada's defining battles.

In these dark times, with the number of veterans of the world wars rapidly dwindling and thousands of Canadian troops risking life and limb in Kandahar, it is only fitting that the First World War, Canada's largest military effort, should receive such close attention. The efforts of Cook and the assorted authors of *Vimy Ridge* are worthy additions to the scholarship on this chapter of Canadian history.

Matt Gurney/Wilfrid Laurier University

STATES, NATIONS AND THE GREAT POWERS

The Sources of Regional War and Peace

Benjamin Miller

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 500pp, US\$39.00 paper (ISBN 978-0-521-69161-1)

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world took almost all theorists in international relations by surprise. Before the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread presumption that, for better or worse, bipolarity would prove to be an enduring structure of international politics. Although there were realists as well as liberals who were optimistic that the more divisive aspects of bipolarity could be overcome, few predicted that the task of managing a bipolar world would come to such an abrupt and peaceful conclusion. The sudden and almost complete collapse of communism was greeted by liberals with unbound enthusiasm and this putative end of history was accompanied by talk of a new world order and the emergence of an expanding zone of peace that would, over time, extend into the peripheral zone of war. Realists urged caution; some even argued that we would soon experience some regret for the passing of bipolarity and most insisted, at least initially, that unipolarity would not persist for any length of time. In fact, the new world order never materialized and unipolarity has proved to be remarkably resilient and so theorists of all colours have had to do some serious rethinking.

Four very significant developments have emerged from the reassessments that have taken place in recent years. First, it is now regularly acknowledged that it is not possible to make sense of world politics simply from a global perspective and that it is essential to accommodate a regional perspective. In *Regions and Powers*, Buzan and Wæver (2003), for example, reassess global security in terms of regional security complexes and in *A World of Regions*, Katzenstein (2005) looks at Asia and Europe in the context of what he calls the American imperium. Second, there has been a growing recognition that research must incorporate both domestic and international levels of analysis. Third, it is argued that we must endeavour to find ways of integrating the insights of divergent paradigms, as Katzenstein and Sil advocate in their forthcoming edited book *Analytical Eclecticism* (2009). Finally, there is a growing insistence that we need to operate on a broader historical canvas.

In this major contribution to the literature on war and peace, Miller demonstrates the enormous dividends that can be reaped by taking all four of these developments into account. Too often, the literature in this area concentrates on a global perspective and so Miller's crucial first move is to acknowledge the centrality of regions in any attempt to understand the complex patterns of war and peace that have developed in world politics across time. He then establishes a theoretical framework that recognizes the importance of taking account of both liberal and realist insights and in the process accommodating variables that are identified at both the global and the domestic level. He tests the framework in different regions of the world over the last two hundred years. Obviously the danger of such a strategy is that the theoretical framework and the process of testing become too complicated for anything of interest to emerge. Miller, however, is extremely parsimonious in the number of variables that he brings into play and he is equally judicious in the choice of the regions and time periods that he investigates. At the end of the day, it is truly remarkable how effectively his theoretical framework accounts for the very different patterns of war and peace that occur in the regions of the world across time.

Miller moves beyond the peace/war dichotomy and establishes a continuum that distinguishes between hot and cold war, on the one hand, and cold and warm peace, on the other. This permits him to make his bold opening proposition that whereas regional and domestic factors are responsible for hot outcomes, it is global factors that are responsible for cold outcomes. Whether a region is characterized by cold war or cold peace is fundamentally affected in Miller's framework by the type of great power involvement. Regional cold wars are related to great power competition or disengagement, whereas cold peace is linked to great power hegemony or cooperation. So in the Middle East, competition between the Soviets and Americans promoted a regional cold war, whereas in the post-Cold War era, great power cooperation opened the way to cold peace. However, great powers cannot prevent regional wars from occurring nor, at the other extreme, can they transform regions into permanently peaceful security communities. So, for example, Miller's theoretical framework shows why the evolution of Europe and Latin America into zones of peace is attributable not to US hegemony but to regional and domestic factors. The most compelling motivations underpinning regional war, according to Miller, are the existence of weak states and a lack of congruence between national and state boundaries. By the same token, the key factors that have moved regions

into permanent peace are the establishment of coherent states and the emergence of liberal democracies.

On the basis of his very elegant and economic theoretical framework, Miller proceeds to provide extremely compelling explanatory accounts of the changing patterns of war and peace in the Middle East since the start of the Cold War as well as in the Balkans from early in the 19th century through to the present day. He then goes on to show the very different bases on which South America and Europe have moved from being regions of hot war to ones of hot peace. Historians may complain that the framework oversimplifies the complexities of regional war and peace, but there is no doubt that, in the social sciences, this book raises the bar considerably. Although Marxists will not be persuaded, it will have to be taken into account by anyone wishing to address an issue that remains absolutely central to our understanding of world politics.

Richard Little/University of Bristol

FOREIGN AFFAIRS STRATEGY

Logic for American Statecraft

Terry L. Deibel

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 450pp, US\$31.99 paper
(ISBN 978-0521692779)

States operate in a complex international environment. Players are multiple and diverse, change is relentless, uncertainty is great, and risk looms. How do states survive and advance their interests? In *Foreign Affairs Strategy*, National War College professor Terry Deibel describes how states should craft foreign policy to weather the tumult of international relations.

First and foremost, Deibel argues that foreign policy planning must start with a sober assessment of the international strategic environment. Policymakers must be aware of international structure, key actors, the balance of power, norms, and degrees of interdependence. This assessment should be coupled with an understanding of the domestic context. In a democracy, public opinion may be poorly informed of international affairs, but it is also fairly constant in its preferences and ultimately sets the parameters of foreign policy.

Given the international and domestic environments, states can deduce the range of threats, opportunities, and interests, and the potential for power and influence. While the concept of a national interest can be ambiguous, Deibel carefully parses the term's subtleties and pitfalls. All too often, policymakers confuse objectives and interests. Deibel also enumerates the dimensions of state power, noting that it can be latent or potential, actual or mobilized, absolute or relative, and is generally contingent on perceptions. Policymakers must ensure that they exercise their state's power sustainably. In weighing their options, states need to estimate a given policy's costs, risk, coherence, and likelihood of success. As Deibel points out, policymakers must continuously reevaluate their assumptions and update their plans in light of new information.

Based on these criteria, Deibel argues, the administration of George W. Bush was overwhelmingly idealistic in its foreign policy. It failed to understand the international environment and did not align its ends and means. Deibel recommends that the US pursue a realistic and moderate foreign policy, which would address serious threats such as climate change, illegal immigration, and budget and trade deficits, while simultaneously abandoning the goal of military supremacy and the export of the American socioeconomic model. In this sense, he joins a chorus of realist scholars who have criticized the Bush administration's foreign policy.

There is much to commend in this book. Deibel's methodical overview of foreign policy planning offers a structured way to think about policy instead of policy recommendations per se. At a time when it appears that external crises and internal ideology drive American policy, Deibel reminds us that there is no substitute for pragmatic planning. The policy goals he prescribes, such as combating climate change, restoring US legitimacy in the world, and securing loose nuclear material overseas, are sensible. His prose is straightforward and blessedly free of jargon, a special feat for a book of this genre.

That said, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* suffers from a number of weaknesses. First, Deibel conceives of foreign policy quite narrowly in terms of national security. Despite the book's length, it provides only cursory coverage of trade policy, human rights, and international development. It also neglects the increasing range of foreign policy conducted outside foreign and defence ministries by other government agencies and nongovernment actors. In the United States, for example, the departments of energy, transportation, and commerce, and the Environmental Protection Agency

are among the many government organizations that shape foreign policy. Furthermore, Deibel assumes that foreign policy is conducted by a rational unitary actor. This may be a fine ideal type, but it provides little guidance to policymakers who face a web of overlapping and competing domestic players.

Second, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* draws its examples almost exclusively from the United States. There is thus some question whether the lessons he offers are transferable to other countries. Medium and small states may have clear international interests, but their clout is usually limited. Consequently, they are usually forced to react to events no matter how good their planning might be. “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” Thucydides reminds us. Deibel is silent about how smaller states should manage this predicament.

Lastly, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* relies heavily on traditional, if dated, works such as those by Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and Kissinger. It overlooks contemporary empirical and organizational research in international relations. Although dealing explicitly with strategy, Deibel barely touches upon the game theory research that has contributed so much to the subject over the last half-century. In this sense, Deibel conflates strategy (choosing a course of action based on the anticipated reactions of other actors) and planning (setting longer term objectives and allocating means to achieve them).

Yet Deibel’s basic point about the importance of foreign policy planning is worth repeating. While perhaps too technical for a general audience, too rudimentary for seasoned academics, and too lengthy for most policymakers, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* covers important ground and is a valuable handbook for graduate students and new practitioners of international affairs.

Simon Collard-Wexler/Columbia University

THE CHINA DIARY OF GEORGE H.W. BUSH

The Making of a Global President

Jeffrey A. Engel, editor

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 544pp, US\$29.95 cloth
(ISBN 978-0-691-13006-4)

George H.W. Bush headed the United States liaison office in China for about 14 months, beginning late October 1974 and ending in December 1975. This was an extraordinarily critical period for China's domestic political future and a difficult time in American politics. In Beijing, Deng Xiaoping fought for power—and his life—against the gang of four, as Zhou Enlai lay dying and Mao Zedong faded in and out of senility. In Washington, President Jerry Ford struggled for legitimacy following Richard Nixon's Watergate-based resignation and Ford's troubling pardon of the disgraced ex-president. Even from abroad, Bush was a superb observer of American politics. If his diary is any indication, he hadn't a clue as to what was going on around him in China.

In 1974, Bush was perceived by Nixon and the chattering class as an attractive Republican party loyalist without much political or intellectual substance. He had been appointed ambassador to the UN at a time when preserving a seat there for the Republic of China (Taiwan) was seen to be a high priority for the Nixon administration and he fought valiantly for that cause. He was unaware that Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had already betrayed Taiwan in their negotiations with Zhou in 1971 and 1972. At the critical point in the struggle to prevent Taiwan's expulsion from the UN, in October 1972, Kissinger flew to Beijing to stroke America's newfound friends, undermining Bush's claim of Taiwan's importance to the United States. Taiwan was expelled and Bush was left looking foolish.

As a Republican politician from Texas with family ties to the party's eastern establishment, Bush was appointed chairman of the Republican national committee in 1973, after Nixon's reelection, an awkward place to be sitting when the Watergate scandal broke. As a reward for his unstinting loyalty, he was offered a choice of the most sought-after ambassadorial posts, London and Paris. He surprised Ford by asking instead to head the liaison office in Beijing. He later claimed to believe China's rebirth as a world power was inevitable and he wanted to be present at the creation. Maybe so, but more likely he was unwilling to exhaust his fortune with the social expenses an ambassador to France or Great Britain had to pay out of his or her own

pocket. Conceivably, he shared the sense of discomfort, perhaps of inferiority, that many Americans allegedly felt in the European haute monde—and the sense of superiority they historically felt among Asians.

Bush went off to China filled with illusions. Somehow he imagined that Kissinger, now secretary of state, would allow him free rein to handle his post as he wished. He imagined that he could meet with and charm Chinese leaders as he had so many ambassadors at the UN. On both counts, he was quickly disabused of the illusion. Kissinger retained other channels for working with the Chinese and made little effort to keep Bush informed. He regularly complained about Bush's invitations to prominent American businessmen and politicians to visit Beijing, aware that Bush was at least as much interested in using these visits to strengthen his future political prospects as he was in strengthening Chinese-American relations. And it was only Bush's future as a possible presidential candidate and his ties to leading Republicans that kept Kissinger from treating him yet worse.

As a matter of course, Chinese leaders would have nothing to do with the mere head of a liaison office. Until relations between the United States and China were normalized and each country was represented by an ambassador, the American representative would be at the bottom of the diplomatic corps. Bush never met with Mao or Zhou. He was received by Vice-Premier Deng ("a very short man") soon after he arrived, but encountered none of the others maneuvering to push Deng aside. Those relatively senior Chinese with whom he met infrequently listened to him cordially—and told him nothing. He complained constantly about how much more access his Chinese counterpart in Washington had to American officials and political and intellectual leaders. Constant attacks on American imperialism in the Chinese media angered him and he warned, reasonably enough, that such rhetoric could turn the American public against China. What he failed to comprehend—and what his very able advisers in Beijing must have tried to explain—was that in the succession struggle, no Chinese dared to be perceived as too friendly to the United States. Criticism of American imperialism or racism was always safe whenever one or another faction voiced its views publicly. Staying away from Bush was the obvious default position, especially when Chinese domestic political tensions were greatest.

The diary demonstrates clearly what Bush's life was like in Beijing. When he wasn't complaining about his isolation or about Kissinger, he was playing tennis or entertaining guests from back home or other diplomats. He records frequent picnics at the Ming Tombs and the Summer Palace. And the reader gets a full account of the Chinese restaurants he enjoyed—how

much Peking duck can one man's arteries take? But one will learn little of what was happening in China or of how and why Bush came to see himself as an expert on Chinese affairs or a friend of Chinese leaders.

The editor, Jeffrey A. Engel, writes well and provides an introduction and a concluding essay, "Bush in China: The making of a global president," both very good. His notes will be enormously useful to the general reader. Unfortunately, he does not provide sufficient Chinese context to allow his audience to evaluate Bush's performance.

Warren I. Cohen/University of Maryland and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

THE FOREVER WAR

Dexter Filkins

New York: Knopf, 2008. 384pp, \$28.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0307266392)

TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS

General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq

Linda Robinson

New York: PublicAffairs, 2008. 432pp, \$29.95 cloth (ISBN 978-1586485283)

Signs of progress in Iraq today are abundant but fragile. Former insurgents have rejected al Qaeda and are in reconciliation talks with the Shiite-dominated government. The government itself recently negotiated a bilateral security pact with the United States, setting 2011 as the withdrawal date for American troops. Violence levels have been declining steadily since 2007.

The country's turnaround has been remarkable. After the 2003 invasion, poor planning for the postwar occupation allowed a bloody insurgency against coalition troops, the Iraqi government, and ordinary civilians to take hold. For the four years that followed, the news out of Iraq focused almost exclusively on suicide and car bombings, sectarian killings and atrocities, and the ascendancy of al Qaeda terrorism. The American-led coalition seemed powerless to protect Iraqi civilians and infrastructure.

New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins worked in Baghdad during this period. Rather than sheltering in his office, he travelled across Iraq to witness events firsthand. He shadowed American troops, met Iraqi officials, and spoke to ordinary citizens whose lives had been shattered by the

violence. His memoir of his experiences, *The Forever War*, is a collection of vignettes, with each chapter devoted to a particular event or theme from his time in Iraq. He describes following the US marines through the 2004 battle to retake Fallujah, a narrow escape from kidnappers, regular death-defying runs in the sweltering heat of the Baghdad night, and close encounters with hostile Iraqis.

Filkins lets events speak for themselves, describing them without passing judgment. His writing is immediate and intense. He recounts a conversation with an American soldier whose unit had accidentally killed an Iraqi woman: “He watched one of the women standing near an Iraqi soldier drop to the ground.... ‘I’m sorry,’ Sergeant Schrupf said, shaking his head. ‘But the chick was in the way’” (91). Describing the aftermath of a suicide bombing, he notes that “the craziest thing...were the heads—how the head of the bomber often remained intact after the explosion. It was the result of some weird law that only a physicist could explain: the force of the blast would detach the bomber’s head and throw it up and away, too fast for the blast to destroy it. So there it would be, the head, sitting on a pile of bricks or underneath a telephone pole” (172).

The book is refreshingly modest, a rare quality in the literature on the Iraq War. Filkins does not claim to be an expert, only a witness, and he refrains from preaching or editorializing. The drawback of this approach, however, is that it offers no overarching conclusions about the war. Readers looking for a grand argument will finish the book feeling frustrated. But those searching for a vivid account of the war’s moral ambiguity and the reality of life on the ground during the worst years of the insurgency should welcome Filkins’s work.

Linda Robinson, a former writer for *US News and World Report*, takes a different approach in *Tell Me How This Ends*, a sweeping account of the 2007-08 surge of American forces under General David Petraeus’s command. The surge had two main components: an increase in the number of American troops, and their redeployment closer to the Iraqi civilians they were meant to protect. The Americans also recruited local fighters to contribute to the effort and worked to reconcile Sunnis with Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government. Robinson focuses on the military side of the story, offering portraits of US and Iraqi commanders, with occasional glimpses of American diplomats and Iraqi officials.

The book is a *tour de force*, simultaneously a political narrative, an evaluation of military strategy, and a tale of military heroes. For readers unfamiliar with the story of the surge, the book is useful primer. Robinson

gives some space to the critics of the surge strategy and Petraeus's leadership, explaining their concerns about overstretched American manpower, strained morale, the US's diminished capacity to address other global conflicts, and the dangers of hiring former insurgents to provide security. This attention to the surge's drawbacks helps to balance what otherwise might have been an uncritical narrative.

For all of the book's strengths, however, Robinson's attempt to be comprehensive yields a narrative that often overwhelms the reader with detail. In a short chapter entitled "The political puzzle," for instance, she covers such varied subjects as American officers' personalities, the tactical application of Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, bureaucratic and political wrangling within the Iraqi government, and special forces operations. Given the surge's complexity, a better approach might have been to organize the book thematically rather than chronologically. And given the debate over the wisdom of the surge, the strategy's critics deserve more attention than they receive. Finally, Robinson leaves readers with the impression that Petraeus alone was the key to the surge's success. While he certainly deserves much credit for the result, it is dangerous to think that one man singlehandedly saved Iraq from disaster. And it is more dangerous still to conclude that the surge has cured Iraq of all its problems.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the surge has dramatically reduced the violence and has provided breathing space for the Iraqi government to reconcile with its domestic enemies. It is difficult to predict whether this newfound stability will last beyond the phased withdrawal of American troops, especially given concerns about the Sunni awakening's long-term viability. After a brief return to Iraq in August 2008, Filkins wrote that "in Iraq, the calm is very fragile. The arrangements that keep the peace here are, by their nature, extremely tentative. You don't have to be a pessimist to recognize that." In November, Robinson observed that "the task facing President-elect Barack Obama is accomplishing the drawdown without reigniting the war and—if possible—in a way that helps Iraq move toward reconciliation."

Given Obama's promise to strengthen the American commitment to Afghanistan, and given Petraeus's forthcoming review of American (and coalition) strategy in Afghanistan, Canadians and their government should consider what lessons the surge can offer for the counterinsurgency mission in that country. These two books are a good place to start.

Arnav Manchanda/Conference of Defence Associations Institute

THEY KNEW THEY WERE RIGHT

The Rise of the Neocons

Jacob Heilbrunn

New York: Doubleday, 2008. 336 pp, \$30.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0385511810)

Few political labels of recent vintage have simultaneously generated as much vitriol and as much confusion as “neoconservative.” In this well-researched, comprehensive account, self-confessed neocon apostate Jacob Heilbrunn sets out to illuminate neoconservatism’s genesis, development on the fringes of government and academia, rise to prominence, and return to the wilderness following the debacle in Iraq. The book’s biggest contribution is its attention to detail and a sprawling narrative that traces neoconservatism’s origins to the earliest years of the 20th century.

In constructing this account, however, Heilbrunn fails to clarify what, exactly, it means to be a neoconservative. How much continuity exists between proponents of rolling back communism in the 1950s and supporters of overthrowing Arab dictatorships in the 21st century? Heilbrunn assumes that, because many of the names are the same, so too are the ideas. Is neoconservatism a fundamentally American phenomenon, or, as he suggests at one point, does it exist “in some form...in every society” (22)? The failure to grapple with these questions makes the book more of a chronicle than a work of real historical analysis.

Heilbrunn’s own neocon pedigree is impeccable—and important, since one of his major arguments is that the neocon movement is ultimately as much about filial piety as it is about policy positions (107). The son of a Jewish refugee and student of Leo Strauss, Heilbrunn was familiar with neocon luminaries like Melvin Lasky, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz while still in high school. Heilbrunn’s Jewish heritage is also important, since he argues that neoconservatism is “largely a Jewish movement,” originating with American Jews who had escaped Nazism and saw a powerful, self-confident America as the only defence against the new totalitarian menace of the Soviet Union (14).

Many neocons began as doctrinaire Trotskyists, eager to destroy the old order that had excluded and persecuted them (including America’s WASP establishment). Unfortunately, Heilbrunn passes over the critical question of why so many Jewish Trotskyists followed Kristol into an unwavering defence of American foreign policy during the Cold War. This lack of attention to intellectual transformations is symptomatic of Heilbrunn’s preference for documentation over synthesis.

The neocons came into their own in the 1960s. Again, Heilbrunn sees their Jewishness as central, leading them to identify with the victorious post-1967 Israel while feeling that the American left (encouraged by Moscow) was singling Israel out for criticism. Meanwhile, they filtered the emergence of street radicalism at home through the prism of their fathers' experiences in 1930s Germany. Heilbrunn quotes former Cornell professor Donald Kagan, who in recalling the 1969 campus takeover by black radicals, said that "for the first time I understood what happened in Nazi Germany" (215).

Heilbrunn suggests that the 1970s in some ways represented the neocons' apogee. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan vindicated their belief in Moscow's aggressive intentions (137-8). They also remained uncorrupted by power, seeking rather to influence policy through a network of magazines and think tanks such as *National Review*, *Commentary*, and the American Enterprise Institute (159-60). These groups served as "a neoconservative employment service" (155), but also created a walled off, self-congratulatory "echo-chamber" where ideas could germinate free from skepticism (242). Here, the neocons mounted a crusade against détente and in favour of Israel and the Vietnam War.

Countering much later mythmaking, Heilbrunn shows that Ronald Reagan was never enamoured with the neocons. He used them to shore up his right flank and jettisoned them once convinced that Gorbachev was serious about ending the Cold War. The turning point was Iran-Contra, a scheme that neocon officials like Elliot Abrams championed. Under pressure from congress and the American public, once the details became public, Reagan reached out to Gorbachev over howls of protest from the neocons, whom Reagan also left holding the bag.

The Soviet Union's demise heralded a return to the wilderness. George H.W. Bush scorned neocons as "the crazies in the basement" and Bill Clinton studiously ignored them, despite their enthusiasm for intervention in Bosnia (194). Heilbrunn shows how many neocons made an alliance of convenience with the Christian right during their post-Reagan exile, jumping into the US culture wars as their foreign policy influence waned (210-2).

The story of the neocons under George W. Bush is by now familiar, though Heilbrunn still manages to make some perceptive observations. He sees the neocon project in Iraq as nothing less than the beginning of a campaign to "transform... the whole Middle East" to end the Islamist threat to both Israel and America (263).

Heilbrunn argues that Bush, like Reagan, disappointed his neocon admirers even if he increasingly adopted their beliefs—emphasizing the

“democracy agenda” in his second inaugural address and welcoming elections abroad even when the results proved destabilizing, for instance in Lebanon or Gaza. Still, as Iraq turned into a bloody quagmire, Bush repeated Reagan’s abandonment of neocon advisers like Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, and Richard Perle. Heilbrunn ends by lamenting that the neocons’ failure in Iraq has “debauched the idea of intervention,” maybe for decades—but with a reminder that neoconservatism has never gone away despite past failures, and will likely remain part of American political discourse in the future (274).

As a family history, Heilbrunn’s book succeeds. It shows how a marginal group of immigrants slowly moved from the fringes to the very centre of power. Heilbrunn is at his best chronicling the web of relationships that sustained the neocons throughout the second half of the 20th century. The sprinkling of quotes from obscure articles and speeches provides context as the book’s central figures grappled with the pressing issues of their day. With its wealth of detail, the book also helps refute some of the hoarier myths that have sprung up around the neocon label.

What is missing is an intellectual history of neoconservatism. Insofar as one of the neocons’ central principles is that “ideas matter,” the lack of attention to their intellectual evolution is frustrating. Heilbrunn’s analysis of Leo Strauss—in many ways the intellectual midwife of neoconservatism—is both insightful and fair (90-7), but he does not devote similar attention to how Strauss’s disciples (and their disciples in turn) adapted the master’s teachings to changing circumstances.

Heilbrunn’s belief in the centrality of the Jewish-American experience is also somewhat overdone. Yes, many leading neocons are Jews. However, apart from a brief period early in George W. Bush’s presidency, these individuals have rarely been close to the centres of power. How then did their ideas, based as they are on Jewish-American identity, come to influence non-Jewish policymakers? Here again, a foray into intellectual history is called for. *They Knew They Were Right* is a valuable corrective to many less sober accounts of neoconservatism and a thorough narrative of its rise and fall. It also will prove a key building block for the author who eventually pens the definitive account of the history of this intellectual movement.

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THE LONG MARCH

The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth

Sun Shuyun

New York: Doubleday, 2006. 270pp, \$34.00 cloth (ISBN 9781400134526)

Getting the facts straight on the long march of Chinese communist forces retreating from southeast China (Jiangxi) ultimately to northwest China (Shaanxi) in 1934-35 is no easy matter. It is, as Sun Shuyun confirms in this readable account, the national myth of the People's Republic of China. Since the march was made known to Westerners by Edgar Snow in his *Red Star Over China* (1937 in London; 1938 in New York), it has been presented as the myth of sacrifice and redemption that vindicated the Chinese Communist party and its then-emerging leader, Mao Zedong, as the rightful rulers of China. These themes were amplified by the party propaganda system and taught—in the fashion of similar national myths in other countries—to generations of Chinese ever since, including to Sun, who learned this during the last decade of Mao's rule (she was born in the 1960s to a military family in China).

Sun is clear from the start: she wants to challenge that myth. For her, digging beyond the patriotic paeans to the long march involves asking: Was communism the magnet that drew the poor in droves to the Red Army? How did it all work in detail? And what happened to the four-fifths of the approximately 100,000 marchers who never reached the end (3)? Her answers are vivid: some people did believe, but many did not and joined by force of circumstance or at the point of a rifle under forced conscription. Leaders, particularly Mao, made numerous mistakes and were often unfeeling of the suffering of the rank and file. The heroism of the long march was mostly the heroism of ordinary people, not Mao, other leaders, or idealized Red Army commanders from the films Sun saw in China as a kid. Mostly, Sun's story emphasizes the experience, memory, and voices of ordinary Chinese, many long forgotten and ill-served by the army and party they either joined or endured. In the end, Sun finds heroism, but it is not the heroism of Mao and the party, but the heroism of these ordinary people. Their example now inspires Sun and her mission is to get their side of the story out. The reason this is important, Sun says, is that the dark side of the long march that emerges helps to explain what went wrong later under Mao. The errors of later years and the causes of the sufferings of the survivors she profiles can be seen in Jiangxi *before* the long march (246). The implication is clear: it was rotten from the start.

Sun presents the stories of the ordinary long marchers—and their lives since then—in the style of a documentary film. This is no coincidence, as Sun is a filmmaker and television producer in England. Her scenes and images are vivid, and the conversations taken from some 40 interviews are moving. She opens and closes with a few individuals, particularly the tragic case of “woman” Wang (Wang Quanyuan), who after years of mistreatment still has faith in the party. These are moving stories, well presented, based on extensive interviews, and all by a Chinese who grew up under Mao but now writes with the freedom of one living in England. What’s not to like?

We should doubt a book that has “the true history” as part of its title. It always reminds me of a politician declaring, “trust me!” Sun’s history is an important example of the “apostate histories” written by Chinese who once embraced Mao’s revolution but now have lost the communist faith. In English-language popular books, these began with Li Zhisui’s *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* in 1996. A slew of personal memoirs followed. The latest splash has been Jung Chang’s and Jon Halliday’s *Mao: The Untold Story* (2005). All claim to reveal a truth that was previously hidden. All are more or less critical of Mao, the revolution he led, and the policies and political turmoil that ensued under his rule in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. All are limited historical sources and should be read with a grain of salt. The more honest books only claim to tell a personal story, but most claim wider authority. The extreme is Chang’s and Halliday’s biography, which does not draw on personal experience and whose use of sources has been roundly criticized by scholars (most tellingly by those who are also quite critical of Mao).

Sun’s book should be read as cinematic journalism of considerable quality, and with much detail that could be useful in a history. But it is more art than social science. Sun is absolutely innocent of the vagaries of oral history and personal memory. She declares that participants’ memories must be true. Alas, as any police officer knows, your least reliable evidence is the eye-witness. Add to this some 60 years of turmoil and any scholar would have to address the weakness of this type of source. Sun says she crosschecks the interviews with documents and scholarly writings, but she does not demonstrate this in the book. There is a bibliography of major works on Communist party history and between 15 and 25 notes for most chapters, but the scholarly literature is not engaged. This is critical for her conclusion that the Futian purges of 1930 were the reason the Jiangxi Soviet collapsed (chapter 3), since work by Stephen Averill (in the volume by Saich & van de

Ven that she cites) contradicts her conclusion. Some direct quotes are provided with citations, but most are not. Sun offers readers her conclusions, not her reasoning. We get the film but not the outtakes or the reasons the scenes were shot in the ways that they were.

Sun's essential humanity and fair-mindedness, as well as her vivid writing, redeem this book. While it is not a scholarly history, it is a reliable source of what survivors remember today, and while imperfect, such memories are necessary contributions to the history not only of the long march but also of China's troubled 20th century. Reading this book will not give the reader the "true history" of the long march, but it will add some powerful experiences of ordinary people whose lives matter and whose stories, despite personal failings, speak of human hope and perseverance. It is inspiring. What Sun Shuyun makes of these personal stories is not history in the social science sense, but it is an artistic vision that has merit. Her version is yet another story, one that is important because it reflects the apostate moment for many Chinese of her generation today.

Timothy Cheek/University of British Columbia

A THOUSAND HILLS

Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It

Stephen Kinzer

New York: Wiley, 2008. 380pp, \$28.99 cloth (ISBN 978-0-470-12016-6)

Journalist Stephen Kinzer has written a magnificent yet disappointing book on the man who rules post-genocide Rwanda, Paul Kagame. Those who admire Kagame's visionary leadership style in bringing peace and security to a once-troubled country will hail the book. It will be widely read by western audiences, who will be all too willing to believe that Kagame is indeed his country's saviour and guardian. For those familiar with Rwandan politics, the book will be a disappointment as we learn nothing new about the man who rules with an iron fist. Kagame's detractors should still read Kinzer's book in order to equip themselves to argue against its unwarranted portrait of Kagame as an African leader who cares deeply about his people and their development.

The story starts with the flight of Kagame's family to neighbouring Uganda during a "practice genocide" in 1960 (11). Kagame's difficult upbringing in the refugee camps of southern Uganda and his role in the 1980s civil war that brought his former friend Yoweri Museveni to power there were the source of Kagame's indefatigable work ethic and commitment to self-reliance. Kinzer praises Kagame's triumphant return to Rwanda in 1990 to overthrow then-President Juvénal Habyarimana's authoritarian regime. Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, then a rebel group, now Rwanda's governing party) stopped the 1994 genocide and saved innumerable lives. Kinzer concludes that Kagame's formative experiences, combined with his military genius in stopping the genocide are sufficient reason to justify his authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, Kagame has already "achieved more than many thought possible" (5). According to Kinzer, he deserves praise as a leader "who had made so much out of so little" instead of suffering the criticism of ill-informed or unduly negative western observers (337). Kinzer even takes noted Rwanda specialist Alison Des Forges to task for her excessive criticism of the regime and dismisses her valid concern that justice in Rwanda is a one-sided affair that tries only ethnic Hutu for genocide while RPF crimes go largely unpunished (329-330).

Kinzer leaves out much of the story, presumably because he has relied on "more than thirty hours of interviews" to analyze and assess Kagame's vision for post-genocide Rwanda, instead of engaging in a careful review of the available literature on Rwanda, which has grown exponentially since the genocide (xi). His heavy reliance on interviews with Kagame himself means that his portrait of Rwandan politics is one-sided. For example, in detailing Kagame's flight from genocidal killers at the time of Rwanda's independence, Kinzer describes the violence as a product of ethnic hatred, instead of a rural and class-based revolution. In explaining why the RPF returned to Rwanda when it did, Kinzer ignores the domestic political realities in Uganda: the government kicked out the Rwandan refugees, Kagame among them, because they had become a political liability.

Kinzer relies heavily on his interviews with Kagame in every chapter except those that deal with the 1994 genocide. In those cases, Kinzer's uses journalistic reports from sympathetic Anglophone observers and Roméo Dallaire's *Shake Hands with the Devil* (2004) to demonstrate Kagame's military genius in stopping the genocide through "calm reason" (97). Yet as Alan Kuperman has demonstrated, Kagame's priorities were securing military victory and taking political power, not saving Tutsi lives. This

oversight allows Kinzer to report without much reflection that one million *Tutsi* lives were lost in 1994. The actual number of lives lost was much smaller. An estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans of *all ethnicities* died in 1994, according to Des Forges. Kagame uses the inflated figure of one million to justify the prosecution of approximately three million ordinary Hutu on the presumption that they participated in the genocide. But Villia Jefremovas's and Scott Straus's research suggests that between 75,000 and 210,000 ordinary Rwandans participated in the genocide, and that many individuals acted under duress from either local authorities or genocidal militias. Kinzer's failure to mention RPF soldiers' revenge killings and other human rights abuses against ordinary Hutu is disingenuous. Nor does he discuss the RPF's presence in eastern Congo.

In offering an account of Kagame's life and the influences that have shaped his aggressive and arrogant style, the book is apologetic from the outset. Indeed, this is its prime weakness. When Kinzer does criticize Kagame, it is only to anticipate critics' arguments and to justify the need for stringent policy in post-genocide Rwanda. Kinzer simply distils the official narrative of how Kagame and his RPF are rebuilding Rwanda. Kagame's driving purpose is to "hack a path through his country's century-old social and political overgrowth" to move Rwanda from genocide to ethnic unity and from poverty to prosperity in only a generation (336). Extensive quotations from Kagame himself ensure that readers are aware of the difficulty of the task ahead. Uninitiated readers may be impressed with Kagame's benevolence as he vigorously seeks western approval for his oppressive and exclusionary policies. Kinzer justifies these policies as necessary to bring "Rwanda from chaos and devastation to peace and stability" (230). This book is an exercise in public relations, aimed at further enhancing Kagame's stature in the eyes of the west.

Susan M. Thomson/Dalhousie University

RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

An Uneasy Partnership

Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, editors

London and New York: Anthem Press, 2007. 333 pp, £50 cloth (ISBN: 978-1-84331-220-8)

Since the early 1990s, European-Russian relations have gone through several phases, from hopes for a strategic partnership to European fears of Russian energy blackmail. Both sides recognize that their relations have come to a turning point, with a need to move away from empty rhetoric in order to make real progress on concrete issues of mutual interest. But given that the exact path forward remains unclear, a clear-eyed and comprehensive understanding of relations between Europe and Russia is crucial today.

Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century offers a broad overview of the current state of the relationship. Though it focuses on the situation at the end of Putin's second term as president, the contributions remain relevant, especially considering that recent events have confirmed the authors' arguments. The book's starting point is the observation that neither the Russians nor the Europeans are satisfied with the status quo in their relations. Putin's "new realism" accepted the limits of Russian foreign policy, but Moscow has nevertheless been unable to achieve its goal of "an equal voice on major security developments in and around Europe." The enlargement of NATO and the EU, and growing western interests in the former Soviet republics, have challenged Russia's geopolitical objectives (290). From the European point of view, the erosion of Russian democracy and the emergence of a "values gap" between Brussels and Moscow has been especially disappointing (53). Yet the EU's "two-level game"—in which members pursue independent policies towards Russia while calling for common action—has posed problems of its own (119, 169). Disagreements within NATO have only exacerbated the situation. The result is that the political cohesion necessary for concerted action is still a long way off.

The Russo-European strategic partnership has generally brought few results. Structural obstacles and conflicting principles have further strained the relationship. In fact, the EU has no idea how to fit Russia into the "new Europe" (120). Russian hostility to European rhetoric on values and norms is rising, and Moscow increasingly doubts whether normative convergence with the EU is necessary (53). The four "common spaces" that were established in May 2003 and the subsequent "road maps" were meant to

provide a foundation for a more realistic approach to the relationship. Yet they only identify possible areas for cooperation without specifying the intermediate stages or ultimate destination. Neither side is satisfied with the state of economic cooperation. Their energy policies, for instance, point in opposite directions. While Russia is expanding the state's role in the energy sector, the EU is calling for market competition and diversification.

Both sides recognize their growing mutual dependence. However, the shared values and common vision for European order that are necessary for a genuine strategic partnership are absent. For the foreseeable future, then, "uneasy" is the best way to describe the partnership (292). The EU must focus on selected areas of mutual interest, and must deal with the Russia that it faces instead of proceeding on false assumptions. Yet even a new pragmatic attitude will suffer problems.

Given that the relationship today remains in flux, reasonable people might disagree over its future. Yet the contributors' general conclusions are realistic and convincing. They address the increasing strains that have been a consequence of Russian attempts to regain international influence, and the elusiveness of cohesive European policy towards Moscow. The volume's analysis of the two-level game is especially useful, not least because of the EU's growing dependence on Russian oil and gas. The only way to achieve unity within the EU is through a more realistic assessment of Russian politics. This restraint is especially important for the EU's original members, who have so far eagerly responded to Russia's proposals for bilateral cooperation.

Graham Timmins' observations (chapter 10) on German-Russian relations during Schröder's term as chancellor are particularly acute. In this period, Berlin's calls for concerted EU action towards Moscow were usually a function of economic self-interest and a desire to strengthen bilateral relations. Russia's own preference for bilateral over multilateral engagement is evident in its close relations with France. Both Paris and Moscow have committed to the concept of "multipolarity" as a way to replace the US-dominated world order (185). Yet Julie M. Newton makes a convincing case (chapter 11) that the Franco-Russian partnership is, at best, symbolic because of Germany's preeminence in Europe.

The EU's newest members have criticized French and German policy towards Russia, but, for the time being, they themselves lack a constructive vision for the future of EU-Russian relations, as Kristi Raik demonstrates (chapter 12). Moreover, few of the EU's new eastern members would agree

with Derek L. Averre's contention (chapter 6) that "offering Russia a more inclusive role in European security governance, with a greater degree of military cooperation, would allow it more scope to defend its interests and prevent a return to a 'mobilization regime'." Yet it is essential to keep Russia engaged in managing European security (104).

Facing Russia's growing self-confidence and the chronic values gap, European pragmatism is the best—perhaps the only—basis for further cooperation. But while it might be sensible for the Europeans to focus their efforts on only a few areas of mutual interest, this approach would mean the failure of the concept of "strategic partnership," which must necessarily be broad. As Hiski Haukkala indicates, it might even "jeopardize the EU's credibility vis-à-vis the rest of its eastern neighbourhood" (144). At the same time, the recent Russian-Ukrainian disputes over gas supplies to the EU seem to undermine some contributors' assumptions about the economic foundations of EU-Russian relations, especially related to energy cooperation and the tension between "Russian dependency on the EU as a market" and "the EU's dependency on Russia as a supplier" (260).

The editors declare that "this study does not make any claims towards comprehensive inclusivity" (xxiii). Yet the book does offer one of the most comprehensive analyses of Russian-European relations to appear in recent years. Its balance and comprehensive scope are particularly valuable. It is a useful source for academic researchers, students, and professionals interested in the subject.

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